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Multiplicity and Uniqueness of Stationary Expected Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining

Abstract

I study uniqueness of stationary expected payoffs in random-proposer coalitional bargaining with transferable utility. Proposer independence of coalition surplus does not guarantee uniqueness, even when the surplus is strictly monotone and every equilibrium features immediate agreement. For M♮M^\natural-concave characteristic functions, including non-monotone ones, I show that stationary expected payoffs are unique and continuous in the primitives, provided that every equilibrium features immediate agreement. To prove uniqueness, I identify an equitable grouping property of maximizing coalitions and show that M♮M^\natural-concavity implies it at every no-delay candidate payoff vector. Using equitable grouping, I show that every no-delay equilibrium payoff vector is isolated and has positive local index. For parameter changes that preserve immediate agreement in every equilibrium, a uniform increase in a player's contribution to every coalition containing her strictly increases her expected payoff, while an increase in her discount factor weakly increases it. I apply these results to joint ventures with coordination costs and government formation with ministerial expertise.

JEL Classification: C78, C72, D71, C62.

Introduction

Models of coalition formation are used in industrial organization, political economy, international trade, and public economics. See the survey by Ray and Vohra [28]. Within the bargaining approach to coalition formation, a central question is whether the model yields a unique vector of equilibrium payoffs. Uniqueness makes comparative statics unambiguous without specifying an equilibrium-selection rule. It also provides a single-valued expected payoff map when bargaining is embedded in a larger model.2 In bilateral bargaining, Rubinstein [29] established uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. In multilateral environments, uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can fail. Examples based on unanimity and simple-majority rules are discussed in Sutton [30] and Baron and Ferejohn [4].

This article studies stationary expected payoffs in a model of coalitional bargaining with random recognition and transferable utility. The random-proposer formulation is related to Okada [25, 26]. In every period, one player is selected as proposer and proposes either a feasible coalition that includes herself or an empty coalition. The protocol is closer to legislative bargaining, however, because members of the proposed coalition vote simultaneously and the protocol precludes the coexistence of multiple coalitions.3 The surplus generated by a coalition is proposer-independent and described by a characteristic function. The feasible family of coalitions is not assumed to be upward closed, and the characteristic function is not assumed to be monotone with respect to set inclusion. This allows negative externalities from participation, so adding a player to a coalition can make it infeasible or reduce its total surplus.

The paper makes three contributions. First, Examples 1 and 2 show that proposer independence alone does not guarantee uniqueness. The first example illustrates how delay can generate positive feedback. When a player whose participation lowers coalition surplus passes more often, the other players receive their expected payoffs more often. This can raise their expected payoffs, making them more expensive to recruit and reinforcing her incentive to pass. The example is related to multiplicity arguments based on proposer-dependent surplus, such as the example in Eraslan and Merlo [10], although here the feedback arises with proposer-independent surplus. The second example illustrates with three players that multiplicity can also arise without delay, even when coalition surplus is strictly monotone.4 The positive results therefore focus on the no-delay domain and identify an additional local condition for uniqueness within that domain.5 Appendix A gives sufficient conditions for no delay.

Second, Theorem 1 establishes uniqueness of equilibrium expected payoffs throughout the no-delay domain for M♮M^{\natural}-concave characteristic functions,6 allowing the recognition probabilities and discount factors to differ across players. The unique equilibrium payoff vector also depends continuously on the primitives. Corollary 1 shows that in a game with three players and simple majority rule, equilibrium expected payoffs are unique for any characteristic function, provided every equilibrium is no-delay.

The proof uses fixed point index methods.7 Equilibrium payoff vectors are characterized as fixed points of a correspondence with total index +1+1. This reduces uniqueness to showing that every equilibrium payoff vector is isolated and has positive local index. When every proposer has a unique optimal coalition, we show that these properties hold. Thus multiplicity necessarily involves an equilibrium at which some proposer is indifferent between multiple coalitions. To handle ties, we show that M♮M^{\natural}-concavity implies an equitable grouping property of maximizing menus at every no-delay candidate payoff vector. This property restricts how tied coalitions differ within each proposer’s menu and how recruitment patterns vary across proposers. We use this structure to deform the payoff correspondence locally to a constant map while preserving the equilibrium as its only nearby fixed point. This establishes isolation and local index +1+1.

Third, we apply these results to joint ventures with coordination costs and government formation with ministerial expertise, and establish comparative statics for productivity and patience. In the first application, coalition surplus combines firms’ productive contributions with congestion and coordination costs across nested groups of firms, allowing surplus to be non-monotone. In the second, a coalition’s surplus is determined by the optimal assignment of its members to cabinet positions. In both applications, the unique equilibrium payoff vector depends continuously on the underlying parameters within the no-delay domain.

The comparative statics hold for M♮M^{\natural}-concave characteristic functions without further structural assumptions. We vary one primitive at a time over an interval on which every equilibrium is no-delay. A uniform increase in a player’s contribution to every coalition containing her strictly raises her expected payoff, by no more than the surplus increase. Increasing her discount factor weakly raises her expected payoff, with equality possible only if the entire equilibrium payoff vector is unchanged. These comparisons allow maximizing menus and supporting proposal distributions to change.

Our approach builds on earlier applications of degree and fixed point index methods to coalitional bargaining. In a bargaining model with a general agreement space, Kalandrakis [17] characterizes pure-strategy stationary equilibria through expected payoff equations and inequalities ensuring optimal coalition choices.8 In a model with externalities in which bargaining continues after coalitions form, Gomes [14] characterizes equilibria using a correspondence defined on coalition expected payoffs that incorporates optimal coalition choices. Both use degree or fixed point index methods to derive determinant conditions for global uniqueness. The condition in Kalandrakis [17] applies to oligarchic voting rules, and he verifies it for unanimity bargaining over a fixed surplus with linear utilities. Gomes [14] verifies his condition for almost all three-player games in which the grand coalition is efficient. Eraslan and McLennan [9] establish payoff uniqueness allowing proposer-dependent families of winning coalitions, assuming every successful agreement divides the same fixed surplus.9 Their fixed point index argument uses a correspondence on proposer-specific inclusion probabilities. Our correspondence is instead defined directly on expected payoff space, analogous to Gomes [14]. We establish positive local indices using equitable grouping and obtain primitive sufficient conditions for payoff uniqueness through M♮M^{\natural}-concavity and no delay.

For bargaining over a fixed surplus, Eraslan [7] establishes uniqueness in the qq-quota version of the Baron and Ferejohn [4] model with general recognition probabilities and discount factors. Kalandrakis [19] develops a method for computing these payoffs that also recovers the uniqueness result. Theorem 1 subsumes this uniqueness result because the unit-surplus qq-quota model has an M♮M^{\natural}-concave characteristic function and rules out delay.

For more general characteristic functions, Yan [31] gives two uniqueness results under uniform recognition probabilities and a common discount factor. The first establishes uniqueness for symmetric nondecreasing characteristic functions, without requiring concavity in coalition size. For convex (supermodular) characteristic functions, her second result establishes payoff equivalence among stationary equilibria in which no proposed coalition can be enlarged without reducing the proposer’s surplus. Neither of these two results is subsumed by our uniqueness theorem for M♮M^{\natural}-concave characteristic functions. However, Corollary 2 establishes uniqueness for symmetric nondecreasing concave characteristic functions and allows recognition probabilities and discount factors to differ across players.

In another paper, Yan [32] also establishes uniqueness with three players and simple majority rule for a monotone characteristic function, again under uniform recognition probabilities and a common discount factor. In contrast, Corollary 1 allows heterogeneous recognition probabilities and discount factors and non-monotone characteristic functions, provided every equilibrium is no-delay.

Coalition-dependent surplus has also been studied under other bargaining protocols. Ambrus and Lu [2] establish uniqueness of Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs for monotone characteristic functions in a continuous-time model with random proposal opportunities and a finite deadline. Battaglini [5] studies a model in which a formateur selects a coalition and subsequently negotiates the allocation of its surplus, retaining the ability to switch coalitions during negotiations. He shows that a holdup problem can lead to the formation of inefficient coalitions.

Allowing coalition-dependent surplus makes it possible to study how productivity and voting rules affect payoff distribution and coalition composition. In the additive qq-quota model of Evdokimov [12], coalition surplus is the sum of its members’ productivities. With uniform recognition probabilities and a common discount factor, an increase in the quota weakly reduces inequality in expected payoffs, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Casas, Gonzalez-Eiras and Loeper [6] study a qq-quota model with productive and unproductive players, where coalition surplus consists of a fixed component YY plus a common contribution η\eta from each productive member. When Y/ηY/\eta is sufficiently large, equilibrium coalitions can include unproductive players while excluding productive ones, making coalition composition inefficient. In both environments, monotonicity and upward-closed feasibility rule out delay by Proposition A.1. The characteristic functions are M♮M^{\natural}-concave, so Theorem 1 recovers their payoff uniqueness results within a common framework.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. § 2 presents the model, characterizes equilibrium payoffs, and introduces the index argument. § 3 presents the multiplicity examples. § 4 introduces the no-delay restriction and the equitable grouping property, and shows that M♮M^{\natural}-concavity implies this property. Section 5 establishes uniqueness and continuity of equilibrium payoffs. § 6 discusses applications, and § 7 derives comparative statics. § 8 concludes. The appendices provide sufficient conditions for no delay (Appendix A) and proofs (Appendix B). The online appendix derives the equilibrium payoffs in the multiplicity examples, establishes robustness of no-delay multiplicity, and characterizes no delay through a limited-harm condition.

The model

Setup

The set of players is denoted by N={1,…,n}N = \{1,\ldots,n\}, where n≥2n \ge2 is the number of players. Each player i∈Ni \in N is endowed with a vector of exogenous characteristics (pi,δi)(p_i,\delta_i), where pi>0p_i > 0 is the probability that player ii becomes a proposer, ∑i∈Npi=1\sum_{i\in N} p_i = 1, and δi∈(0,1)\delta_i \in(0,1) is the discount factor of player ii.

A coalition is a subset C⊆NC \subseteq N. An allocation is a vector x∈R+nx \in\mathbb{R}^{n}_{+}, that is, xi≥0x_i \ge0 for each i∈Ni \in N. Each player i∈Ni \in N values only private consumption, and her utility equals her consumption. The set of feasible coalitions is denoted by W\mathcal{W}, with ∅∉W\varnothing\notin\mathcal{W}. For each player i∈Ni \in N, let Wi={C∈W:i∈C}\mathcal{W}^{i} = \{C \in\mathcal{W}: i \in C\} denote the set of feasible coalitions that include player ii, and assume that Wi\mathcal{W}^{i} is non-empty. Let χ:W→R++\chi:\mathcal{W} \to\mathbb{R}_{++} be the characteristic function and note that χ(C)>0\chi(C) > 0 for all C∈WC \in\mathcal{W}. The characteristic function is not required to be monotone with respect to set inclusion, so the surplus generated by a coalition may decrease when players are added to it. Moreover, W\mathcal{W} is not required to be upward closed, so C∈WC \in\mathcal{W} and C⊂DC \subset D do not necessarily imply D∈WD \in\mathcal{W}.

When acting as a proposer, player ii can either pass or propose to form any coalition C∈WiC \in\mathcal{W}^{i}. Passing is associated with a special empty coalition C∅=∅C_{\varnothing} = \varnothing that generates zero surplus, χ(C∅)=0\chi(C_{\varnothing}) = 0. An allocation xx is feasible for coalition CC if ∑j∈Cxj≤χ(C)\sum_{j\in C} x_j \le\chi(C). A pair (C,x)(C,x) is a proposal for player ii if C∈Wi∪{C∅}C \in\mathcal{W}^{i} \cup\{C_{\varnothing}\} and xx is feasible for CC. The set of all proposals that player ii can make is denoted by Pi\mathcal{P}_i.

In each period t=1,2,…t = 1,2,\ldots, player i∈Ni \in N becomes a proposer with probability pip_i and makes a proposal (C,x)∈Pi(C,x) \in\mathcal{P}_i. If the proposed coalition is C∅C_{\varnothing} (meaning that the proposer passes), the game moves to the next period. And if she makes a proposal (C,x)(C,x) with C∈WC \in\mathcal{W}, then the members of CC simultaneously vote to either accept the proposal or to reject it. If at least one player in CC rejects the proposal, the game moves to the next period. Otherwise, the allocation xx is implemented, each player j∈Nj \in N receives payoff δjt−1xj\delta_j^{t-1}x_j and the game ends. Each player receives a zero payoff if an agreement is never reached.

In this article, I focus on stationary strategies. A stationary mixed proposal strategy πi\pi_i of player ii is a probability distribution over feasible proposals, that is, πi∈Δ(Pi)\pi_i \in\Delta(\mathcal{P}_i), and a stationary voting strategy βi\beta_i of player ii is a mapping βi:R→[0,1]\beta_i:\mathbb{R} \to[0,1], where βi(xi)\beta_i(x_i) is the probability that voter ii votes to accept the proposal that allocates xix_i to player ii. In particular, the stationary proposal strategies are history-independent and the stationary voting strategies do not depend on the history of proposals, the proposer’s identity, the proposed coalition, or the proposed shares to other players.

A stationary strategy profile σ=(π,β)\sigma= (\pi,\beta) is a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium if there are no profitable deviations given any history, any proposer ii, and any proposal (C,x)(C,x).

I restrict attention to stationary subgame perfect equilibria with weakly undominated voting strategies. For the remainder of the article, I will refer to these strategy profiles as equilibria.

Expected payoffs

Any equilibrium strategy profile σ\sigma induces a vector of expected payoffs v(σ)∈R+nv(\sigma) \in\mathbb{R}_{+}^{n}, where vi(σ)v_i(\sigma) is the expected payoff of player ii. Throughout the paper, v(σ)v(\sigma) denotes the payoff vector induced by a particular strategy profile σ\sigma. When no strategy profile is being fixed, I write yy for a generic expected payoff vector. Thus, yy is a candidate payoff vector until it is shown to satisfy the equilibrium equations. Let ρi(σ)\rho_i(\sigma) denote the distribution over coalitions induced by player ii’s proposal strategy πi\pi_i, treating rejected proposals as passing. For any vector z∈Rnz \in\mathbb{R}^{n} and subset of players C⊆NC \subseteq N, write zCz_C to denote ∑i∈Czi\sum_{i \in C} z_i. Using this notation, for each i∈Ni \in N, we can write:

vi(σ)=δipiSi(v(σ))+δi∑j∈Npj∑C∈Cji(v(σ))ρj(σ)(C)vi(σ),ρi(σ)∈Δ(Ci(v(σ))).(1)\begin{aligned} v_i(\sigma) &= \delta_i p_i S_i(v(\sigma))+\delta_i\sum_{j\in N}p_j\sum_{C\in\mathcal{C}_j^i(v(\sigma))}\rho_j(\sigma)(C)v_i(\sigma),\\ \rho_i(\sigma)&\in\Delta(\mathcal{C}_i(v(\sigma))). \tag*{(1)} \end{aligned}

where

Si(v(σ))=max⁡C∈Wi∪{C∅}(χ(C)−vC(σ)),Ci(v(σ))=arg⁡max⁡C∈Wi∪{C∅}(χ(C)−vC(σ)).(2)\begin{aligned} S_i(v(\sigma))&=\max_{C\in\mathcal{W}^i\cup\{C_{\varnothing}\}}\left(\chi(C)-v_C(\sigma)\right),\\ \mathcal{C}_i(v(\sigma))&=\underset{C\in\mathcal{W}^i\cup\{C_{\varnothing}\}}{\arg\max}\left(\chi(C)-v_C(\sigma)\right). \tag*{(2)} \end{aligned}

and Cji(v)={C∈Cj(v):i∈C or C=C∅}\mathcal{C}_j^i(v)=\{C\in\mathcal{C}_j(v):i\in C\text{ or }C=C_{\varnothing}\}. We call Si(v(σ))S_i(v(\sigma)) player ii’s proposer surplus, the greatest gain over her expected payoff that she can obtain when recognized. Her continuation probability is ∑j∈Npj∑C∈Cji(v(σ))ρj(σ)(C)\sum_{j\in N}p_j\sum_{C\in\mathcal{C}_j^i(v(\sigma))}\rho_j(\sigma)(C), the probability that bargaining continues to the next period or a coalition containing ii forms.

The expected payoff vi(σ)v_i(\sigma) is player ii’s continuation payoff if the current proposal is rejected and the game moves to the next period, discounted to the current period. In an equilibrium, weakly undominated voting requires each player i∈Ni\in N to vote to accept any proposal xx with xi>vi(σ)x_i>v_i(\sigma) and to reject any proposal with xi<vi(σ)x_i<v_i(\sigma). When xi=vi(σ)x_i=v_i(\sigma), voter ii is indifferent. Without loss of generality, we assume that player ii votes to accept when indifferent.10 A proposer will also never offer a share to another player ii that is greater than ii’s expected payoff vi(σ)v_i(\sigma). Thus vi(σ)v_i(\sigma) is the cost of player ii’s participation in a coalition, and v(σ)v(\sigma) is the corresponding cost vector.

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