WorksMathematics
Singular Perturbations for Control Systems Safety
Abstract
Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) offer a powerful theory for enforcing safety in dynamical systems. Yet, applying this framework to complex systems is challenging when subsystems are feedback-interconnected and operate at different timescales. Such structures arise naturally in multiphysics systems and in control architectures where physical plants interact with optimization, estimation, and control algorithms. In many of these settings, safety involves only part of the system, motivating the design of reduced-order certificates. Inspired by singular perturbation theory, we establish sufficient conditions, involving separation between slow and fast dynamics, under which a reduced-order safety certificate can be lifted to the full interconnected system. Specifically, we construct a composite CBF ensuring forward invariance of a lifted subset of the original safe set. We also show that the certified safe set expands monotonically as the tuning parameter accelerating the fast dynamics is reduced. Numerical results validate the approach on two robotic systems: a planar 2-DoF manipulator with motor dynamics and a 6-DoF UR10e manipulator controlled by a suboptimal optimization algorithm.
Introduction
The growing complexity of autonomous systems operating in real-world environments has led to extensive research in the field of safety-critical control, that is, the design of control strategies that guarantee the satisfaction of safety specifications, as reported in the recent survey [1]. Among the many approaches proposed in the literature, Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) provide a systematic means of enforcing safety in nonlinear systems by imposing suitable conditions on their dynamics (see, e.g., the works [2, 3, 4]). Their applicability extends to a wide range of domains, including robotic systems [5], autonomous vehicles [6], and human-robot interaction scenarios [7]. Beyond enforcing individual safety specifications, several works have investigated the interaction between safety requirements and other control objectives, such as stability. In particular, the combination of Control Lyapunov Functions (CLFs) and CBFs has been explored through optimization-based formulations [8] and analytical constructions for safe stabilization [9]. Related works address robustness to disturbances through the input-to-state safety (ISSf) framework [10], as well as difficulties arising with simultaneous stabilization and constraint satisfaction, including topological deadlocks via hybrid CLF-CBF control [11] and parametric model uncertainty through composite adaptive certificates [12].
As modern control architectures increasingly involve multiple coupled components, constructing safety certificates for the overall system has become a critical challenge (see the early references [13] and [14]). To address safety in interconnected systems, several compositional approaches have been investigated. In particular, [15] establishes small-gain conditions to verify ISSf properties of interconnected systems. The small-gain approach has been extended in [16] to deal with high-relative-degree constraints. This direction is further developed in [17], which provides sufficient and necessary conditions for compositional ISSf of nonlinear interconnected systems. Similarly, [18] constructs barrier certificates for interconnected stochastic hybrid systems by combining subsystem-level certificates through small-gain conditions. Other approaches combine multiple safety constraints through Boolean compositions, see [19] and [20], including nested and combinatorial specifications [21].
A complementary research direction focuses on exploiting reduced-order models to simplify the synthesis and implementation of safety-critical controllers while retaining formal guarantees for the overall system (see, e.g., the recent survey [22]). In [23], input-to-state safe backup sets transfer reduced-order safety guarantees to full-order systems under input constraints. Several contributions exploit structural properties of the dynamics to establish safety guarantees. For systems admitting a strict-feedback representation, the paper [24] develops a backstepping-based (see, e.g., [25]) construction extending safety conditions from a virtual controller to the actual input. Related approaches exploit the mechanical structure of robotic systems through energy-based constructions [26], while other techniques investigate model-free tracking of safe reference velocities [27]. More recently, [28] introduced a framework based on projection mappings and simulation functions to establish safety relationships between a reduced-order model and the corresponding full system. From a complementary perspective, the authors of [29] investigate the existence of safety certificates for full-order systems starting from safe reduced-order models. Related methods for constructing safety certificates in the presence of high-dimensional dynamics include the use of High-Order CBFs (HOCBFs) [30], which address the challenge of high relative degree by recursively constructing safety conditions through higher-order derivatives of the safety function, partial input-output feedback linearization-based constructions [31] and rectified CBFs [32]. The aforementioned approaches provide valuable tools for safety certification by exploiting specific structural properties of the system dynamics. A complementary research direction concerns the safety of interconnected systems evolving at different time scales, where the interactions between subsystems must be explicitly accounted for.
The work was partially funded by the FISA-2023-00210 project APACHE - CUP J53C25000520001, by Next Generation EU, National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), Mission 4, Component 2, Investment 3.3; CUP J33C24001490009, and by IMA S.p.A.
The authors are with the Department of Electrical, Electronic and Information Engineering, University of Bologna, 40136, Bologna, Italy (e-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]).
Classical singular perturbation (or timescale separation) theory (see, e.g., the pioneering work [33] and the surveys [34, 35, 36]) provides a powerful framework to analyze the relationship between the reduced-order and full-order dynamics from the point of view of stability and convergence properties. Timescale separation (or singular perturbation) theory provides a suitable framework for analyzing not only systems that couple different physical domains (e.g., the electrical and mechanical components of robotic systems) but also physical plants interconnected with online control and/or optimization algorithms. The work in [37] develops CBF-based reformulations of gradient flows for constrained nonlinear optimization, ensuring forward invariance of the feasible set. The papers [38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44] rely on stability arguments grounded in singular perturbation and averaging methods to guarantee practical safety when the invariance certificate is dynamically and approximately imposed with the well-known extremum-seeking mechanism (see, e.g., [45]). Moreover, the works [46], [47] propose a safe feedback optimization method that enforces state constraints at all times, see also a related application to optimal power flow pursuit [48]. More closely related to the present work, [49] investigates locally implemented safety filters for networked systems through a two-timescale design and analysis. See also the conference paper [50], which investigates safety guarantees for singularly perturbed systems by using an approach based on input-to-state stability.
The main contribution of this paper is a singular perturbation framework for certifying safety of nonlinear feedback-interconnected systems. Specifically, we establish sufficient conditions under which a CBF designed for a reduced-order model can be lifted to get a safety certificate for the full interconnected system. As customary in singular perturbation approaches, we distinguish between fast and slow dynamics. The fast dynamics is assumed to possess a tunable parameter to modulate its speed and a stable equilibrium manifold, while the slow one collapses to the reduced-order model when the fast state is on the equilibrium manifold. Under sufficient timescale separation, we characterize a safe invariant set for the interconnected system controlled by a safe policy designed on the reduced-order model. Drawing on composite Lyapunov methods for stability analysis, we construct a family of composite CBFs, depending on the tuning parameter. We combine the reduced-order safety certificate with a specially designed shaping function obtained from a Lyapunov function associated with the fast system. The resulting forward invariant set quantifies the admissible deviations of the fast states from their equilibrium manifold. We further establish a nesting property of these safe sets as timescale separation increases and characterize the exact recovery of the reduced-order safety certificate in the singular limit. The framework accommodates nonlinear feedback interconnections without requiring a cascade structure or inversion-based feedback laws. The safety controller can therefore be implemented using the reduced-order model, while the resulting safety guarantees hold true for the full interconnection.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in the short conference paper [51], which established the basic safety-lifting result. The present paper extends that result by introducing a broader family of composite CBFs based on nonlinear transformations of the boundary-layer Lyapunov function and by establishing the nesting property of the corresponding certified safe sets. It also provides self-contained proofs of the theoretical results and a more detailed geometric and analytical interpretation of the safety guarantees. Finally, the numerical validation is expanded to include suboptimal safe control of a robotic manipulator simulated in a high-fidelity physics engine.
The paper is organized as follows. In § 2, we review some preliminaries on safe control for continuous-time systems and the related safety guarantees. In § 3, we introduce the framework under consideration and our goal. In § 5, we present motivating examples to illustrate the application of the proposed framework. In § 8, we establish the main theoretical results of the paper, accompanied by a graphical and analytical interpretation based on a toy example, and we formally prove them in the Appendix. Finally, in Section VI, we evaluate the proposed approach with numerical simulations and virtual experiments.
Notation: is the set . We denote by the vertical concatenation of the vectors . The symbol denotes the Euclidean norm for vectors and its induced norm for matrices. Let and . Then . A continuous function is a class- function, denoted by , if it is strictly increasing, , and . Given a continuously differentiable function , we denote by and its gradients with respect to the first and second arguments, respectively. For vector-valued functions, denotes the corresponding Jacobian matrix. Given a set , we denote its closure by .
Preliminaries on Safe Control
We start by recalling the theoretical foundations of Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) for continuous-time nonlinear systems of the form
where is the system state at time , is the control input at time , and describes the system dynamics. The next definition introduces the notion of a zero-superlevel set of a function.
Definition 1 (Zero-Superlevel Set). Given a function , the zero-superlevel set of is defined as , while .
Let us now introduce as the safe set of system (1), i.e., the set of states that satisfy the prescribed safety specifications. Accordingly, we say that system (1) is safe with respect to if there exists a set that is forward invariant for system (1). A popular tool for constructively certifying the safety of system (1) is given by CBFs [2], [8], [22].
Definition 2 (Control Barrier Function): A continuously differentiable function with zero-superlevel set is said to be a Control Barrier Function (CBF) for system (1) on if there exists a class- function such that
for all .
The above condition characterizes the set of control inputs that are compatible with the prescribed safety constraint. As formalized by the following result, which directly follows from [22 Corollary 1], any sufficiently regular feedback controller satisfying the CBF condition for all guarantees that the safe set is forward invariant for system (1), thus certifying its safety with respect to .
Lemma 1: Consider a continuously differentiable function with zero-superlevel set . Assume that is locally Lipschitz and that for all . If a locally Lipschitz feedback controller satisfies
for all , and some function , then is forward invariant for the closed-loop system
Singular Perturbations for Safety: Problem Statement
In this section, we outline our procedure based on singular perturbations to lift reduced-order safety certificates in feedback-interconnected systems. Indeed, we focus on systems of the form
where and are the system states at time , is the input applied at time , and are the vector fields of the slow and fast subsystems, respectively, and is a tunable parameter to modulate the relative speeds of these two subsystems. By borrowing the typical nomenclature of timescale separation (or singular perturbations) for stability analysis (see, e.g., the recent survey [36] or [52 Ch. 11]), we call and (2a) the slow state and the slow system, respectively; and (2b) are the fast state and the fast system, respectively. Figure 1 describes system (2) in terms of block diagrams.
Figure 1. Block diagram representation of (2).
Reduced-Order Safety Certificates
Our approach builds upon a safety certificate established for a reduced-order representation of the interconnected dynamics. Its lifting requires three main ingredients: safety specifications involving only the slow state, an equilibrium manifold for the fast dynamics, and a feedback policy satisfying a robust safety condition for the reduced system.
First, we consider safety constraints that depend only on the slow state . Hence, we denote by the safe set of the slow subsystem (2a) and define the safe set for the overall system (2) as
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the safe set in the full state space, obtained by extending the slow-state safe set along the unconstrained fast-state directions.
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the safe set (cf. (4)).
The second requirement concerns the existence of a parameter-dependent equilibrium function for the fast subsystem (2b).
Assumption 1: There exists a continuously differentiable function such that
for every and .
Under this assumption, the fast dynamics can be replaced by their equilibrium manifold to obtain a lower-dimensional description of the overall interconnection. Specifically, restricting the full system (2) to the manifold yields the reduced-order vector field defined as
This representation describes the evolution of the slow state in the idealized regime where the fast state instantaneously tracks the equilibrium associated with the current slow state and input . Hence, as illustrated in Figure 3, the corresponding architecture is obtained by replacing the fast subsystem with the static map .
Figure 3. Block diagram representation of the reduced system (4).
Finally, we require a feedback controller that enforces a robust safety condition for the reduced-order model (4) on a compact zero-superlevel set .
Assumption 2: There exist a continuously differentiable function with a compact zero-superlevel set , a continuously differentiable and -Lipschitz continuous function , an -Lipschitz continuous function , and a safety margin such that
for all .
Unlike the standard CBF condition (see Definition 2), the inequality (5) incorporates a strictly positive safety margin . This additional margin provides robustness against the discrepancy between the reduced-order dynamics and the actual dynamics (2a) incorporating the fast state .
Boundary Layer System
Following standard practice in singular perturbation theory (see, e.g., [36]), we complement the reduced-order description by introducing the so-called boundary layer system. This auxiliary model captures the evolution of the fast state when the slow state is held constant, providing insights into the stability properties of the fast subsystem. Specifically, let and be fixed values of the slow state and input, respectively. By holding these quantities fixed and introducing the stretched fast time variable , we isolate the fast dynamics from the evolution of the slow subsystem. We then express the fast state relative to its equilibrium as , yielding the boundary layer system
with , where is defined as
As depicted in Figure 4, the boundary-layer system (6) represents system (2) in the limit , which is equivalent to freezing the slow state and the input at a given .
Figure 4. Block diagram representation of (6) in the original coordinates .
We characterize the stability properties of system (6) through the following Lyapunov conditions.
Assumption 3: There exists a continuously differentiable function such that
for all , , , and some .
Together, Assumptions 2 and 3 characterize two complementary properties of the interconnected system (2): (i) robust safety of the reduced-order dynamics and (ii) exponential stability of the equilibrium manifold for the boundary-layer dynamics. The proposed approach combines these two properties to construct a safety certificate for the interconnected system within the full safe set defined in (3), as conceptually illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Conceptual illustration of the proposed framework. Starting from a safety certificate for the reduced-order dynamics, the goal is to construct a forward-invariant set within the safe set (cf. (3)) of the full system accounting for the fast-state deviations from the equilibrium manifold .
We conclude this section by imposing some regularity conditions on the dynamics functions and of system (2).
Assumption 4: The functions and are locally Lipschitz continuous. Moreover, is -Lipschitz continuous uniformly with respect to .
Motivating Scenarios
To illustrate the applicability of our framework across diverse domains, this section presents representative scenarios characterized by distinct multi-timescale interconnections. Specifically, we focus on both physical plant-level couplings (such as electromechanical scenarios) and algorithmic interconnections, wherein physical systems interact with an online optimization and/or a control algorithm.
Planar Robotic Arm with Actuator Dynamics
First, we focus on a fully actuated planar robotic arm with two degrees of freedom, in which the timescale separation is intrinsically determined by the nature of the mechanical and electrical domains. Specifically, the mechanical dynamics of the system are described by the standard rigid-body equations
where the terms , , and represent the inertia matrix, the Coriolis matrix, and the gravity vector, respectively, and the diagonal and positive definite matrices model the joint viscous friction and the motor torque constants, respectively, while
are the vectors of angular positions, angular velocities, and motor currents, respectively. The mechanical plant is coupled with the electrical dynamics of the two motors, namely
where is the voltage applied to the motors, while , , are positive definite diagonal matrices representing the inductance, resistance, and back-electromotive force constants, respectively. By assuming that can be arbitrarily designed, we treat it as the tunable parameter in (2). Hence, we note that (9) and (10) can be framed within the interconnected system (2) with
and equilibrium function defined as
Moreover, since , each equilibrium is globally exponentially stable uniformly in . Hence, Assumptions 1 and 3 are satisfied. Assumption 2 thus corresponds to finding a safe controller for the reduced mechanical dynamics, namely
where is the effective damping matrix incorporating the back-electromotive force of the motors.
Physical Dynamics with Safety Control Algorithm
Second, we consider the case in which the slow subsystem (2a) is a given plant, while the fast one (2b) is an optimization algorithm aimed at finding a safe control input that minimizes the distance from a desired but possibly unsafe control action. We formulate this scenario by introducing, for all , an optimization problem of the form
where is the cost function for a desired policy , and is a CBF for the plant dynamics . In real applications, optimization problems like (13) cannot be solved exactly in real time due to limited computational resources. Instead, their solution estimates are iteratively refined by optimization algorithms (e.g., a gradient flow) that we can model as dynamical systems. Thus, by generally denoting by the specific algorithm flow used to dynamically address problem (13), the resulting interconnected system is given by
where modulates the speed of algorithm (14b), while is an output map selecting only the current solution estimate associated with the overall algorithmic state , which may contain additional variables (e.g., multiplier estimates and momentum terms). In this setup, Assumption 2 is satisfied when problem (13) admits a solution function that is continuously differentiable in the set . Assumption 1 is satisfied provided that admits an equilibrium function such that for all . Assumption 3 is achieved with exponential stability of for system
uniformly in , namely, when the considered algorithm converges exponentially fast to the solution of (13) for all . Finally, Assumption 4 corresponds to Lipschitz continuity of the plant and algorithm dynamics and .
Singular Perturbations for Safety: Main Result
In this section, we establish the main safety result for the interconnected system (2) by combining the reduced-order safety guarantees encoded in (cf. Assumption 2) and the stability properties of the boundary-layer system (6) encoded in (cf. Assumption 3).
Theorem 1: Consider system (2) and let Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 hold. Then, there exist and a family of composite barrier functions parameterized by , such that the following properties hold.
Forward invariance. For all , the zero-superlevel set
is forward invariant for the closed-loop system
Equivalently, for all , it holds for all .
Nesting of certified safe sets. The family of certified safe sets , indexed by , is monotonically non-increasing with respect to set inclusion, i.e.,
for all .
Recovery of the reduced-order certificate. For every compact subset of , it holds
Moreover, for every compact subset of the strict superlevel set , there exists such that for all .
Finally, the closure of the union of all certified safe sets recovers the entire region , namely
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the Appendix, with the three results established in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.
The idea of the proof is to show that we are able to construct a composite CBF for the interconnected system (2). The composite function combines the reduced-order CBF (cf. Assumption 2) with a suitable nonlinear transformation of the boundary-layer Lyapunov function (cf. Assumption 3). In analogy with singular perturbation theory for stability, the first statement of Theorem 1 establishes that, for sufficiently small values of , the sets are forward invariant for the interconnected system (2), thus ensuring safety since by construction. Beyond forward invariance, the second statement characterizes how the certified safe region depends on timescale separation. Specifically, the nesting property establishes that decreasing (i.e., increasing the timescale separation) progressively enlarges the set of initial conditions from which safety of the interconnected system can be guaranteed. Finally, the third statement characterizes the asymptotic behavior of the certified safe sets as . In particular, the composite CBF converges uniformly to the reduced-order CBF on compact subsets of . Consequently, every compact subset of the strict superlevel set is contained in a forward-invariant set for sufficiently small . In this sense, the certified safe sets asymptotically recover the entire region as expressed by the closure of their union.
Graphical Interpretation of Theorem 1
To illustrate the theoretical guarantees provided by the main results, we consider as a toy example the following two-dimensional singularly perturbed system
with , , , and . The fast subsystem (16b) admits the equilibrium mapping , which yields the single-integrator reduced-order model . We consider the physical safety specification for the slow state defined by the CBF , which encodes the safe set
with .
The safe feedback policy is obtained by smoothly approximating a CBF-QP that minimally modifies the nominal controller to enforce the safety constraint (5) in Assumption 2 with . For this system, the boundary-layer error dynamics are exponentially stable and admit the quadratic Lyapunov function . The figure illustrates the geometry of the certified sets with the timescale parameter threshold computed by following the steps of the proof of Theorem 1. In Figure 6 we provide graphical representations that help visualize the concepts highlighted in the following discussion.
Figure 6. Illustration of the certified sets and their associated dynamics. Top left: Sets for 10 values of , illustrating the nesting property established in Theorem 1. The blue dashed curve denotes the fast equilibrium manifold. Top right: Zoomed view highlighting the common region around the fast equilibrium manifold. Bottom left: Time evolution of for different values of . Bottom right: Phase portrait illustrating outward-pointing dynamics near the physical safety boundary and inward-pointing or tangent dynamics at the boundary of the lifted certified set.
a) Geometry and nesting of the certified sets: The top left panel of Figure 6 illustrates the certified safe sets for different values of , together with the nonlinear equilibrium manifold . All certified sets lie within the physical safe region . As established by Theorem 1, the certified safe sets are nested with respect to the singular perturbation parameter , i.e., for all , that is, decreasing enlarges the region of initial conditions for which safety of the full interconnected system can be guaranteed. Specifically, the zoomed view in the top right panel highlights a common neighborhood of the equilibrium manifold in which, in light of the aforementioned construction, the composite barrier function coincides with the physical CBF . Consequently, within this neighborhood, the certified safe sets coincide with the physical safe set .
b) Influence of timescale separation on safety: The bottom left panel of Figure 6 shows the evolution in time of for different values of , starting from a common initial condition . As the timescale parameter increases, the fast-state mismatch persists for longer and may produce larger deviations from the reduced-order dynamics. Thus, the safety condition may be violated when the fast subsystem is not sufficiently fast to compensate for the initial mismatch. This illustrates the importance of timescale separation in extending reduced-order safety guarantees to the full interconnected system.
c) Forward invariance through safety lifting: The bottom right panel of Figure 6 shows the phase-plane representation in the coordinates, where is the fast-state mismatch. In these coordinates, the slow dynamics satisfy , showing explicitly how the fast-state mismatch acts as a perturbation to the reduced-order dynamics. Although the controller satisfies the reduced-order CBF condition, this additional term may cause the vector field to point outward at the physical safety boundary , as illustrated by the red trajectory. In contrast, the composite certificate accounts for the fast-state deviation and identifies a forward-invariant subset of the physical safe region. The blue and green trajectories show, respectively, inward-pointing and initially tangent vector fields at the boundary of the composite safe set (i.e., ). These observations provide a geometric interpretation of Theorem 1: rather than requiring the entire physical safe set to be forward invariant, the lifting procedure constructs an explicitly characterized full-state region in which safety is guaranteed using a controller designed solely on the basis of the reduced-order model.
Numerical Simulations
In this section, we showcase the applicability of the proposed framework in the scenarios introduced in § 5. Namely, we first consider a fully actuated 2-DoF robotic arm with joint motor dynamics, and then we consider a 6-DoF robotic manipulator controlled through an iterative optimization algorithm. These examples illustrate two distinct sources of timescale separation: the coupling between the mechanical and electrical dynamics of a robotic arm, and the cyber-physical interconnection between the physical system and a dynamic safety controller (i.e., an optimization algorithm). In both cases, the safety controller is designed based solely on the reduced-order dynamics, while the simulations and the virtual experiments account for the full-order dynamics.
Planar Robotic Arm with Actuator Dynamics
First, we consider the fully actuated 2-DoF robotic arm described in § 5-A, where the mechanical dynamics (9) are coupled with the electrical dynamics (10) of the joint motors. In accordance with our proposed framework, the safety controller is designed based solely on (12). The physical parameters of the robotic arm and the joint motors are provided in Table I, assuming identical links and motors.
| Symbol | |||||||
| Value | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.167 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| Units | kg | m | kgm | Nms/rad | Vs/A | Vs/rad |
Table I. Manipulator and Actuator Parameters
As discussed in § 5, the motor inductance is treated as a tunable parameter to modulate the timescale separation between the mechanical and electrical dynamics. We consider safety constraints comprising both the joint limits and the obstacle avoidance requirements. Specifically, the joint limits are and and the corresponding safety functions are defined as
In addition, we consider 5 circular obstacles with radius m centered at the workspace coordinates , , , , and . The corresponding safety functions are
where is the position of the end-effector. Since these constraints have a relative degree of two with respect to the input, we construct a High-Order CBF (see, e.g., [30]) for each , namely, given , we define
To simplify the filter design, all constraints are aggregated into a single CBF using the Log-Sum-Exp formulation (see, e.g., [53]), namely
where modulates the approximation sharpness. The reduced-order safety controller is then designed to satisfy the robust CBF condition
where is the vector field of the reduced-order system (12).
We implement a smooth safety controller, following the approach discussed in [54], which is applied to a nominal PD controller with gravity compensation. The system is initialized at rest (, ) and is controlled toward the target configuration . The safety controller parameters are , , and . Simulations are performed for 10 linearly spaced values of . Results are reported in Figure 7: specifically, the top left panel and the top right panel illustrate the corresponding joint trajectories, the bottom left panel shows the evolution of the aggregated CBF (18), and the bottom right panel depicts the system trajectories in the joint configuration space, highlighting the regions associated with the prescribed safety constraints. For sufficiently small values of , the trajectories remain within the safe region, consistent with the timescale separation paradigm established in Theorem 1. By contrast, increasing slows the electrical dynamics relative to the mechanical subsystem, leading to larger transient discrepancies between the actual motor currents and their equilibrium values. As illustrated, these mismatches may lead to safety violations, despite the controller being designed to enforce robust safety on the reduced-order dynamics.

Figure 7. Results for the 2-DoF robotic arm with joint motors. Blue-to-cyan solid lines indicate safe trajectories (); dash-dotted red lines denote safety violations (). Top left: Time evolution of . Top right: Time evolution of . Bottom left: Time evolution of the CBF (23). Bottom right: Corresponding trajectories in the joint space. The red areas represent forbidden configurations induced by the obstacles in the robot workspace.
Physical Dynamics with Safety Control Algorithm
We now consider the suboptimal safe control scenario introduced in § 5-B, where timescale separation arises from the interaction between a physical plant and a dynamic optimization algorithm. Unlike the previous example, the fast subsystem does not represent neglected physical dynamics, but rather the dynamic refinement of the control input through a suitable optimization algorithm that asymptotically imposes the safety constraint. The virtual experiments are performed on a 6-DoF UR10e robotic manipulator simulated in the MuJoCo physics engine. The robot is modeled at the kinematic level, with joint configuration and joint velocity . Starting from the initial configuration , the manipulator is tasked with following a joint-space reference path , obtained through piecewise cubic interpolation of a set of waypoints. The nominal control policy is defined as
with . The path-progress variable is governed by the dynamics
with parameters and .
The environment contains spherical obstacles, deliberately positioned near the nominal end-effector path to induce collision-avoidance maneuvers. See the left panel of Figure 8 for the nominal (i.e., without safety constraints) end-effector trajectory and selected robot configurations along the nominal path. To account for possible collisions involving the tool flange of the robot, we represent its position by a point and account for its physical dimensions by introducing an inflation radius m. For each obstacle , we define the safety function

Figure 8. Left: Nominal unsafe trajectory. Right: Safe trajectory with the suboptimal safety filter ().
where and are the center and radius of the -th spherical obstacle, respectively. Moreover, we incorporate the joint limits in the safety function. Given the lower and upper joint limits , we define
where is a smooth function defined as
The resulting safety function is then defined as
where are tunable design parameters. Specifically, is a scaling factor, and selects a compact safe set with a regular boundary. Using the safety function (23), the safety filtering problem is formulated as
In accordance with the proposed framework, both the joint configuration and the path-progress variable constitute the slow state . Rather than solving (24) to optimality at every instant, we dynamically adjust the control input through a gradient-flow algorithm applied to an unconstrained version of problem (24). Specifically, we introduce a smooth cost function defined as
where encodes the robust safety constraint and is the smooth Softplus function
with a tunable parameter that controls the approximation sharpness. The state-dependent weight is
where is the residual of the robust CBF condition obtained with the nominal control input, is a tuning parameter, and reads as
Thus, by introducing to modulate the learning rate, the resulting gradient-flow dynamics are
Hence, in this scenario, the control input constitutes the fast state, i.e., . In particular, since is strongly convex in uniformly in , system (29) admits an exponentially stable equilibrium manifold , where , thus satisfying Assumption 3. Hence, in this scenario, the reduced-order model corresponds to the plant dynamics controlled with . Then, since it is possible to show that, for sufficiently large values of and , the equilibrium strictly satisfies the robust CBF condition, i.e., for all , Assumption 2 is also satisfied. The interconnected plant and gradient-flow dynamics are numerically integrated using the Radau method available in SciPy, with the solver restarted at each outer simulation time step s. The parameters are set to , , , , , , , . Simulations are performed over a 5-second horizon for 19 values of , chosen as 9 linearly spaced values in and 10 linearly spaced values of . To evaluate the effect of finite optimization speed, we also consider an ideal safety controller obtained by solving the optimization problem (24) to optimality at each time step, using IPOPT within the CasADi framework [55].
Figure 9 compares the time evolution of the aggregated safety function (23) for the selected values of . For sufficiently small values of , the gradient-flow algorithm evolves on a faster timescale than the manipulator, allowing the computed suboptimal control input to track its instantaneous equilibrium more closely. See, e.g., the resulting trajectory for in the right panel of Figure 8. Correspondingly, the resulting trajectories satisfy the prescribed safety constraints. As increases, the optimization algorithm responds more slowly to changes in the robot configuration, producing larger transient deviations from its equilibrium. The numerical results show that these deviations can lead to violations of the safety constraints.
Figure 9. Time evolution of the CBF (23) for the scenario involving physical dynamics and a safety control algorithm. The viridis color gradient indicates increasing values of . Safe trajectories are represented by solid lines, whereas unsafe trajectories are represented by dash-dotted lines. The optimal solution is represented by the dashed black line.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated safety of nonlinear feedback-interconnected systems through a singular perturbation approach. By suitably combining reduced-order safety properties and stability conditions of the fast dynamics, we established sufficient conditions under which a controller designed solely on the reduced-order model guarantees safety of the overall interconnection. Furthermore, we characterized the dependence of the certified safe sets on the timescale separation parameter, establishing their nesting property and asymptotic recovery of the reduced-order safe region as the fast dynamics become increasingly fast. We illustrated the applicability of the proposed framework through numerical simulations on an electromechanical 2-DoF robotic arm and a suboptimal safe control architecture in which a 6-DoF robotic manipulator interacts with an online optimization algorithm.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Part I: Forward Invariance
The idea of the proof is to combine the reduced-system safety properties encoded in (cf. Assumption 2) with the stability properties of the boundary-layer system (6) encoded in (cf. Assumption 3) in order to guarantee that ensures safety for the overall interconnected system (2). To this end, the proof exploits the parameter to accelerate the fast dynamics relative to the slow dynamics. Intuitively, this allows one to make the approximation errors arbitrarily small. These errors arise from the fact that the properties of and are established only for the limit cases detailed in Assumptions 2 and 3, rather than for the original interconnection (2).
First of all, since they will be useful later, let us introduce the function and the constants , , defined as
We highlight that the above constants exist and are finite since is compact (cf. Assumption 2) and , , , , and are continuous (see Assumptions 1, 2, and 4, respectively). Moreover, the arbitrary constant ensures that , even when the equilibrium manifold is constant, thereby avoiding degeneracies in the parameter bounds introduced below. Then, by Lipschitz continuity of and (cf. Assumption 4) and (cf. Assumption 2), we note that the solution to system (2) exists and is unique (see, e.g., [52 Thm. 3.2]). Let us rewrite system (2) in the error coordinate , thus obtaining
in which we introduce and defined as
Then, we evaluate the Lie derivative of along the trajectories of subsystem (31a). Specifically, by adding and subtracting the term (see the definitions of (4) and (32a)), we obtain
for all , where in (a) we exploit (5) (cf. Assumption 2) and we use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since the vector field is -Lipschitz continuous (cf. Assumption 4), the difference satisfies
By using inequality (34) and defined in (30d), we are able to further bound the right-hand side of (33) as
Now, we evaluate the Lie derivative of the Lyapunov function characterized in Assumption 3 along the trajectories of (31b) and we use (8b) to write
where in (a) we use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the bounds (8c) (cf. Assumption 3) and (30b), and (31a), in (b) we add and subtract the term (see the definitions of (4) and (32a)) in the last norm, and use the triangle inequality, while in (c) we use the Lipschitz continuity of (cf. Assumption 4) and the bound (30c). Now, let us define some constants that will be useful in the following, namely
Consequently, we can rewrite the bounds (35) and (36) as
We now introduce the scalar function
For brevity, we will denote in the following. By using the lower bound in (8a) (cf. Assumption 3) and the definition of (cf. (39)), we have
Consequently, by substituting (40) into (38a), we obtain
Now, we characterize the evolution of . To this end, let us define . Then, for all , we use the bound (8a) to further bound the right-hand side of (38b) as
Moreover, since (see the lower bound (8a) in Assumption 3), we have
for all such that . Therefore, by substituting (42) into the above equation, we obtain
By multiplying both sides by and using the definition of (cf. (39)) in (44), we obtain
Now, let us introduce
These definitions allow us to compactly rewrite (45) as
Then, we introduce the upper bound defined as
First of all, we note that . Now, let us consider an arbitrary . Consequently, the bound (48) holds and, by defining , it holds
for all . With this result at hand, we introduce defined as
and use it to construct the composite barrier function defined as
To lighten the notation, we also define as
as it will be useful in the following to analyze the evolution of along the trajectories of (31). From the definition of (cf. (62)), we obtain by direct computation
which allows us to write
for all . Since is continuously differentiable and positive definite (cf. Assumption 3), is continuously differentiable wherever . Moreover, by construction, for and for . Therefore, since is also continuously differentiable, is continuously differentiable for all such that . Now, consider an arbitrary pair such that . Since , we have that , which implies . We now distinguish two cases: (i) and (ii) . Suppose that case (i) holds and, thus, and . Therefore, by using (52), in this first case, the Lie derivative of along the trajectories of (31) satisfies
where in (a) we use the definition of (cf. (64)) and the fact that , while in (b) we use the fact that . Consider now case (ii) and, thus, . By using (52) and (59), we have
Since is -Lipschitz continuous and increasing (cf. Assumption 2) and (see (62)), it holds
which, combined with the definition of (cf. (64)), allows us to further bound the right-hand side of (68) as
where in (a) we use (66). Finally, we verify the nonvanishing gradient condition required by Lemma 1. Consider an arbitrary . If , then . By the strict safety margin in Assumption 2, we have , implying that . If instead , then , and Assumption 3 guarantees that . Moreover, follows from (65) and the fact that . Hence,
Therefore, we conclude that for all . The proof follows by using (69) to invoke Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Part II: Nesting of Certified Sets
The first part of the proof consists in showing that
To this end, by rearranging (66) (cf. Appendix A), we write
for all . Moreover, from the definition of in (62), we recall that for all . Now, let us consider and, to lighten the notation, let us define and , where for a generic is defined in (57) (cf. Appendix A). This definition implies
Furthermore, given , the bound (50) leads to
For , the desired inequality (59) holds because
For , let us define
To achieve (59), we need to prove for all . Differentiating and using (60), we obtain
where in we add and subtract the term . Now, we recall that (see (61)); thus, the second term on the right-hand side of the above equation is non-negative. Observe also that by construction and that . Therefore, by using (64), we get the bound
Then, let us introduce defined as
which is strictly positive by positivity of the exponential function and by for all . Thus, it holds
where in we use (65) and . Moreover, we observe
Since (see the definitions of and in (63) and (51), respectively) and for all (see (66)), (68) implies for all , thus proving (59). Consequently, recalling the definition of (cf. (52)), we have
The proof follows by combining (70) and the definition of the certified safe set (cf. (15)).
Proof of Theorem 1. Part III: Asymptotic Recovery
First, let us establish that converges to uniformly on every compact subset of as . Let be an arbitrary nonempty compact set. By definition of (cf. (52)) and since is nonnegative (see its definition in (51)), we have
Since and are continuous functions (see the definition of in (39) and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3), there exists a positive constant such that for all . If , the desired equality holds by definition of (cf. (51)). Otherwise, if , let us define . Then, by using (55), we have
for all and . Since and for , the bound (72) implies , thus proving that is non-decreasing in . Integrating both sides of (72) over (with ) and using (see (51)), we obtain
where in (a) we use the bound (72) and introduce , in (b) we use the fact that is non-decreasing, in (c) we evaluate the integral, while in (d) we use the fact that . By recalling the definition of in (46), we have
By rearranging (73) and using (74), we obtain
Given , the bounds (73) and (75) ensure that, for all , it holds
where . Combining (76) and (71) yields
for all and . Taking the supremum over in (77) and letting establishes the claimed uniform convergence, that is,
Now, let be an arbitrary compact subset of . As is a particular example of the compact set considered above, we can apply the same arguments used above to find and such that
for all and . Moreover, by continuity of and compactness of , there exists . From (79), we thus obtain
Therefore, given , we have for all and . This implies that . Hence, we are ready to prove the recovery of the entire safe region. Since for all and since is closed (cf. Assumption 2), we have
To establish the reverse inclusion, consider any such that . Applying the previous arguments to the singleton yields for sufficiently small values of . If instead , Assumption 2 yields
Setting and given , the continuous differentiability of (cf. Assumption 2) allows us to perform a first-order Taylor expansion of around and obtain
for sufficiently small values of . With these results at hand, let us consider a sequence of points with and as . By applying the previous argument to each singleton , we show that every point belongs to for sufficiently small values of . Since as , we then use the definition of closure to obtain
Since was arbitrary, we conclude that every point in belongs to the closure of the union of the sets , i.e.,
The combination of (81) and (85) yields the desired result.
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