WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
Endogenous Parcel Contiguity and Rent Indeterminacy in a Finite-Household Monocentric City
Abstract
We study a monocentric city with finitely many households, each of which may hold any measurable set of land and incurs commuting costs that depend on the spatial distribution of its holdings. In equilibrium, every parcel is an interval and parcels are ordered by lot size from the center outward. The freedom to adjust land holdings at any location restricts supporting rents to a band between the competing bid rents and the assigned household's bid rent. This band excludes rents that support the same allocation when lots are restricted to intervals, including the one constructed by Berliant and Fujita (1992), and makes the existence of a supporting rent a substantive question even with identical households. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a locally supporting rent that meets every household's budget and deters all small deviations. We also show that any equilibrium minimizes the real resource cost of attaining equilibrium utilities and extend the sorting result to heterogeneous households under a single-crossing condition. Finally, we discuss the relation to hedonic models, distinguishing the prices of whole parcels from location-specific rents that govern the cost of changes in parcel boundaries and fragmentation.